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Chicken & Brinkmanship

Bertrand Russell / Thomas Schelling · 1959

"The game of Chicken models situations where each side wins most by not swerving, but mutual non-swerving is catastrophic — so the art is credibly committing to not swerving while leaving the opponent a face-saving exit."

The idea

Russell used Chicken — two cars racing toward each other, first to swerve loses — as a metaphor for nuclear crisis. Schelling turned it into the doctrine of brinkmanship: deliberately approach the brink to force the other side to back down.

Why it works

Payoffs are: swerve / don't swerve. If you can credibly commit — throw the steering wheel out the window where the opponent sees it — you win by forcing their swerve. But if both commit, both crash. Brinkmanship is managed commitment: create just enough shared risk of disaster that the more risk-averse side concedes, while keeping a last-second exit so catastrophe remains avoidable. Cuban Missile Crisis and price wars both run on this edge.

The takeaway — recall it first
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What is the strategic logic of credibly committing not to swerve in Chicken?

Further reading

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The explanation above is written with AI assistance. These are the originals — go to them to check it.

  • The Strategy of Conflict — chicken, brinkmanship, commitment (Schelling, 1960)Thomas Schelling / Wikipedia
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