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Repeated Games & Axelrod's Tournaments

Robert Axelrod · 1984

"Axelrod invited game theorists to submit programs for iterated prisoner's dilemma and the simplest — Tit for Tat, cooperate first then copy the opponent — won, showing cooperation can evolve without central authority when the shadow of the future is long enough."

The idea

Axelrod ran a computer Olympics for prisoner's dilemmas in 1980: every submitted strategy played every other for 200 rounds. The winner was four lines long.

Why it works
The takeaway — recall it first
Further reading

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