Canonical · Game Theory & Strategy · Theory
Signaling & Costly Signaling Theory
Amotz Zahavi / Michael Spence · 1973
"Zahavi and Spence showed signals become credible only when they are costly enough that faking them would not pay — so reliable signaling is about burning resources you couldn't afford to burn if you were lying."
Zahavi watched Arabian babblers make extravagant, dangerous displays to signal status — wasting energy precisely to prove they could afford to waste it.
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